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Abstract: Donor governments face a dilemma when providing development 
aid to states that violate human rights. While aid may contribute to positive 
development outcomes, it may also contribute to rights violations committed 
by these regimes. This article provides a conceptual framework for donors to 
address this dilemma in a normatively justified way. Drawing on recent 
methodological advancements in normative political theory, we develop a 
distinctively political framework of dilemmas, suggesting three models: 
complicity, double effect and dirty hands. We consider this framework in the 
context of development aid, discussing the relevant considerations for donors 
in different cases. We demonstrate that an approach to development 
assistance that acknowledges political realities does not have to be 
normatively silent. 
 
Keywords: International development, political dilemmas, aid, donor 
governments, human rights, authoritarian regimes 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years on from the devastating famine that claimed the lives of over a 
million people, some have described Ethiopia’s transformation as “an 
economic miracle”.1 Over the past decade, the country has seen impressive 
economic growth, a significant fall in poverty, infrastructure development 
and dramatic improvements in the health and education of the population.2 
Many attribute this transformation to a combination of the Ethiopian 
government’s commitment to promoting development and the foreign aid 
provided by donor governments.3  
Nevertheless, human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, have 
criticised donor governments for turning a blind eye to rights abuses 
committed by the Ethiopian government, fuelling accusations of donors’ 
complicity in civil and political rights violations. 4  In 2012, lawyers 
representing an Ethiopian farmer named in court papers as “Mr O” 
announced they would begin proceedings against the UK government. The 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) funded an Ethiopian 
government programme that, they claimed, had led to severe human rights 
abuses. Mr O stated that the Ethiopian government’s “villagisation” 
programme led to the forced resettlement of thousands of families, including 
                                                        
1 Smith 2014. 
2 UNDP 2012. 
3 Carothers and Gramont 2013; Easterly 2014, 123–7, 156–7; Levy 2014; Stiglitz 2003, 26. 
4 Human Rights Watch 2010; see Easterly 2014; Loewenberg 2013; Oakland Institute 2013. In 
discussing human rights violations in this paper, we focus on the civil and political rights 
described in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
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his own, to places that lacked basic amenities. He also claimed to witness the 
beating and rape of villagers by soldiers.5  
The case demonstrates the tension between the benefits of development aid 
and concerns over rights violations committed by aid recipients, which we 
will hereafter refer to as “the donor’s dilemma”. How should donors decide 
whether to continue providing aid to such states? If donors do continue to 
provide aid to these governments, what other measures can be taken to 
ensure they are not complicit in rights violations?  
In this paper, we construct a framework on how donors can address this 
problem in a normatively justified way. We do this by developing a 
distinctively political theory of dilemmas – drawing on recent methodological 
advancements in normative political theory – which identifies three 
paradigmatic models: complicity, double effect, and dirty hands. We consider this 
framework in the context of development aid to states accused of rights 
violations, and demonstrate how donors can identify the different types of 
dilemmas, and respond accordingly. The paper makes several contributions. 
First, it contributes to normative political theory by developing a distinctively 
political understanding of dilemmas, and uses the context of development aid 
to highlight the different features of the framework. Second, it informs the 
polemic debate in development policy and research on whether donors 
should provide aid to states involved in rights violations by demonstrating 
how a politically realistic approach to aid can address normative concerns 
related to civil and political rights. In doing so, the paper also contributes to 
broader debates in international relations on foreign aid and human rights.  
                                                        
5 Mr O’s case is discussed in several media articles, Anon 2012a; Birrell 2014; Smith 2014. The 
case is also described by Easterly 2014, 158–9.  
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The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the specific context of 
international aid to regimes that violate rights, which gives rise to the donor’s 
dilemma. We focus on official development assistance (ODA) provided by 
bilateral donors. Second, we develop a general framework for analysing 
political dilemmas, in which we specify an analytical distinction between 
different models of dilemmas and consider the normative and political 
significance of each. Third, we examine the general framework in the context 
of development aid and flesh out the relevant considerations in different 
cases, drawing on empirical examples. This, we argue, serves to demonstrate 
that a political approach to aid, which is sensitive to political contexts and 
structural constraints, need not be normatively silent. 
 
AID, POLITICS, AND DEVELOPMENT 
In the past two decades, there has been much debate about the effectiveness 
of aid in promoting development. The growing consensus is that the question 
of whether aid “works” is misguided, as the answer depends on the type of 
aid and outcome under consideration.6 We do not focus on aid effectiveness 
here. Instead, we proceed on the basis of two assumptions: first, aid has some 
positive impact on socioeconomic outcomes, such as income and health; and 
second, aid is most effective when delivered through national governments 
and institutions in developing countries, as is widely recognised by 
international development policymakers.7 The dilemma arises because aid has 
                                                        
6 Hudson 2015; Qian 2015; Wright and Winters 2010. 
7 This is demonstrated by the emphasis on national ownership and using state institutions to 
provide aid as a core component of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (see OECD 2005/2008). 
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additional and potentially undesired political effects, which have implications 
for the relationship between donor and recipient governments.  
We focus on two political effects. First, aid provides donors with influence 
over recipient governments, which can reduce the accountability of recipient 
governments to their citizens. There has been considerable attention in 
international relations research on the extent to which donor governments 
should and do use this political influence to further their own interests in 
global politics. 8 Donors have also sought to use this influence to achieve more 
development-oriented goals by attaching conditions to the provision of aid 
based on recipient governments implementing economic and political 
reform.9 Critics of aid, however, have long argued that in providing donors 
with this influence, aid reduces democratic accountability because it makes 
governments less dependent on its citizens for tax revenue, leading to lower 
accountability to citizens.10  
A second political effect of aid is strengthening the position of the 
government relative to other actors in a society, such as opposition political 
parties and civil society. Aid can provide a government access to greater 
material resources and often bolsters the legitimacy of a regime. 11  While 
strengthening the position of the government may be a positive outcome in 
some contexts, critics of foreign aid argue that providing aid to more 
                                                        
8 For example, see Morgenthau 1962; Hayter 1971; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Rai 
1980; Wang 1999. 
9 Dijkstra and White 2002. 
10 See Brautigam 1992; Deaton 2013; Mkandawire 2010. 
11  Robinson 1993. A government’s claim to legitimacy broadly refers to a population 
accepting the government’s authority to rule over them (see Gilley 2009; Lipset 1959). 
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autocratic regimes impedes democratisation and the protection of human 
rights. This is because aid increases these governments’ “resources, 
patronage, and power in relation to the rest of society”, and thereby 
“enhances the hold of governments over their subjects”.12  
Therefore, the donor’s dilemma arises because in addition to helping improve 
socioeconomic outcomes, aid can strengthen the position of the recipient 
governments, including governments that violate citizens’ political and civil 
rights, which may undermine the positive effects of aid. As aid provides 
donors with influence over recipient governments, some view donors as 
complicit in rights violations committed by these governments. This dilemma 
is further complicated in the context of developmental regimes – governments 
of poorer nations that actively promote socioeconomic development through 
close involvement in the market, and have achieved some success in doing 
so.13 Most developmental states are non-democratic and have frequently been 
implicated in the violation of political and civil rights. Indeed, in his analysis 
of developmental states, Leftwich argues “the combinations of their 
sometimes brutal suppression of civil rights, their apparently wide measure 
of legitimacy, and their generally sustained performance in delivering 
developmental goods… are intimately connected”.14  
The success of developmental states has led many to question the focus on 
democratic governance and human rights in development assistance – 
particularly as donor efforts to promote more accountable governance are 
                                                        
12 Bauer 1986, 45–6; Easterly 2007; Wright 2009. 
13 Evans 1992; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Amsden 1994. 
14 Leftwich 1995, 418. 
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widely seen as having produced disappointing results.15 This has prompted 
the recent “political turn” in development research and policy.16 This political 
turn – which the donor community has labelled “thinking and working 
politically” (TWP) – emphasises the need for donors to better engage with the 
political realities of local contexts17, and to accept that there are “tensions, 
conflicts [and] difficult trade-offs over time between the various goals of 
development – such as growth, democracy, stability, equity and autonomy”.18  
The emphasis on political realism, the acceptance of trade-offs, and the 
importance given to domestic leadership has meant that proponents of TWP 
tend to take a favourable view of developmental regimes, even if they exhibit 
authoritarian characteristics or are involved in rights abuses. 19  Indeed, 
proponents of TWP have criticised the donor emphasis on democratic 
governance and rights on the basis that “what poor developing countries 
really need are leaders who… can get things done”.20 However, many have 
expressed concern with the “top down” approach of TWP and the danger that 
“issues of power, rights and justice too easily get lost” and “we end up 
helping governments that routinely kill or suppress their opponents [to] 
‘deliver development’”.21 Indeed, there has been growing criticism of donor 
                                                        
15 Andrews 2013; Levy 2014. 
16 Carothers and Gramont 2013; Kelsall 2014; Levy 2014. 
17 Green 2013. Further information is provided at the TWP Community of Practice website: 
https://twpcommunity.org/ (accessed 22 November 2016).   
18 Leftwich 1993, 605. 
19 Booth 2011; 2012; Kelsall 2008; see also Khan 2007. 
20 Booth 2011, 3; cf. Carothers and Gramont 2013, 212–4. 
21 Green 2014. 
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governments’ willingness to overlook rights abuses in developing countries, 
as the Ethiopia example demonstrates. 
As such, this dilemma has led to a polemic debate in development research 
and policy, which we look to move beyond. Effective development policy, we 
argue, requires recognition of the complex political contexts and structural 
constraints to development. This does not mean, however, that normative 
challenges of the donor’s dilemma ought to be sidelined. As we have 
explained, the different effects of aid are closely connected. Therefore, the 
precise nature of these various effects and the normative significance of the 
dilemmas they generate need to be better understood. To fully understand the 
analytical complexity of the donor’s dilemma, we turn to the broader question 
of the nature of political dilemmas.  
 
A POLITICAL THEORY OF DILEMMAS 
Drawing on recent methodological developments in normative political 
theory, we develop a novel conceptual framework for analysing political 
dilemmas, which challenges the simplistic dichotomy characterising the 
current debate between idealistic and abstract “normative theory” on the one 
hand, and the kind of gritty approach to politics offered by TWP on the other. 
In brief, we maintain that by analysing the predicament donors face as a 
political dilemma one can retain a normative perspective while being 
sensitive to the realities of politics. We suggest three possible models of 
political dilemmas. Rather than dissolving the donor’s dilemma by 
philosophical fiat, these models acknowledge its political significance and 
offer a perspective for practically engaging with it. With the conceptual 
distinction between different dilemmas in place, in the next section we 
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consider this general conceptual framework in the context of the donor’s 
dilemma. 
What is a dilemma? In moral philosophy, a dilemma arises when an agent is 
required to make a choice between two (or more) incompatible actions, and 
each choice she makes involves a moral wrong; either because she will act in a 
way that is morally prohibited, or she will fail to act in a way that is morally 
obligatory. Subjectively, some cases of moral conflict may appear insoluble to 
the agent; importantly, however, moral dilemmas are an ontological, rather 
than an epistemic concept. The debate in moral philosophy centres on a 
disagreement over whether “genuine” moral dilemmas can exist, with some 
philosophers denying that they can.22 If a choice must be made between two 
incompatible actions, this is seen as equivalent to self-contradiction; one of the 
supposed moral requirements must be false.23  
Within moral philosophy, this extreme position has been heavily criticised for 
failing to acknowledge the importance of dilemmas. First, moral dilemmas 
explain the sense of remorse, guilt and distress that accompany choosing one 
action over another, without describing these attitudes as irrational. Second, 
moral dilemmas allow for the existence of what Williams calls “moral 
remainders”, meaning that we can acknowledge that in choosing one horn of 
the dilemma, the force of the other horn does not simply disappear. Even if, 
all things considered, the choice was justified, the unmet moral requirement 
                                                        
22 Gowans 1987; Mason 1996. 
23 See for example Conee 1982.  
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generates further duties, for example of apology or reparation. 24 Third, it may 
be the case that conceptually, in a morally perfect world, where all agents act 
as they should, moral dilemmas would not exist. Yet our world is not morally 
perfect in this sense; insofar as the role of moral philosophy is to provide 
guidance to actually existing moral agents, it must acknowledge the reality of 
moral dilemmas.25 By acknowledging this reality, we are able to recognise two 
imperatives when facing a moral dilemma: choosing the lesser of two evils, 
and acting to avoid, as much as possible, additional moral dilemmas in the 
long term. 
To be useful for a normative analysis of politics, however, the literature on 
moral dilemmas must be reconstructed. To do this, we build upon recent 
methodological developments in normative political theory, which highlight 
the distinct character of political conduct and the norms that ought to apply to 
it.26 According to these approaches, politics is a distinctive normative context 
for two main reasons. First, politics is primarily a collective endeavour rather 
than an individual one. This means the norms that apply to it should take into 
account the specific social and institutional contexts, and the behaviour of 
other actors given these contexts. Norms such as democratic accountability, 
                                                        
24 Williams 1981. The fact that each choice involves a moral wrong does not entail that both 
were equally wrong. The agent may be required to choose one horn of the dilemma of the 
other (“the lesser evil”), and still be said to be committing a moral wrong. For a discussion, 
see Raz 1986, 357–66. 
25 Hill 2002. 
26 By this we mean to offer a generally ecumenical account of otherwise different approaches 
such as non-ideal theory, practice-dependence, and political realism. For further elaboration 
on these approaches and their differences, see Erman and Möller 2015; Rossi and Sleat 2014; 
Waldron 2016. There are of course other ways in which normative theory can be sensitive to 
reality, for example by taking into feasibility constraints or public opinion. For a discussion, 
see Baderin 2014; Sleat 2016. 
  
12 
 
for example, are specific to political conduct. Second, while moral concerns 
play a role in political conduct, political actors also pursue ends that cannot 
be subsumed into moral ends, such as order and stability. Furthermore, there 
is significant disagreement and uncertainty among actors regarding the value 
and justification of these ends. For these reasons, it would be a mistake to take 
moral norms, specifically those that apply to individual actions, and assume 
that they can simply be applied, mutatis mutandis, to political conduct.  
Understanding dilemmas politically, therefore, means interpreting them as 
particular relations between the actions of political actors situated in specific 
social and institutional structures, and the effects of these actions. More 
specifically, political dilemmas arise where the nature of this relation means 
that the pursuit of a desirable end would have an undesired effect for the 
political actor.  
The clash between ends arises from structural and institutional constraints on 
political agency, not from the incommensurability of the ends themselves, 
independent of this context. In some circumstances, where dilemmas are 
avoided, the agent’s actions achieve their desired effects and advance her 
goals in a harmonic fashion; in others, her actions would fail, as the pursuit of 
desired outcomes with regards to one end generates undesired effects with 
regards to the other end. Even then, some such failures are not political if they 
result from bad luck or simple misjudgement by the agent, which explain 
why the negative effect happened. Other cases, however, are political when 
the clash between ends result from the interactions between different agents 
within specific social, legal, and institutional structures. Interpreting the 
dilemma as political, therefore, requires an analysis of the distinctive 
normative context in which it arises.  
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This interpretation of dilemmas is “political”, in the sense we have described 
above, in two additional ways. First, unlike the traditional understanding of 
dilemmas in moral philosophy, it does not focus on individual agents and 
their moral integrity, but rather on the institutional context of their actions 
and their effects.  Second, it obviates the conceptual debate over whether 
“genuine” dilemmas exist, from an objective point of view. As the focus is on 
political agents, the pursuit of their ends, and the tension between those ends; 
dilemmas pose a normative political problem whether or not they are merely 
subjective. This is particularly important because political judgement also 
involves acknowledging the limits of knowledge imposed on the actor under 
conditions of uncertainty, often not knowing how to weigh the options she 
faces, or even if they are commensurable. 
With these points in mind, we turn to three models of political dilemmas that 
are relevant to the case of the donor’s dilemma, reconstructing classical 
accounts of moral dilemmas: complicity, double effect and dirty hands.27 In all of 
these models, the political agent undermines an important end to which she 
was committed; however, the different structures of the relation between 
action and effects suggest that the short-term and long-term judgments are 
different for each of these models.  
 
                                                        
27 This framework is inspired by and indebted to Jennifer Rubenstein, and specifically her 
analysis of “the problem of spattered hands” (2015, 87–115). However, while we share 
Rubenstein’s general commitment to political ethics (see pp. 207-227), our institutional and 
structural interpretation of the three models of political dilemmas differ considerably from 
her more traditional reading, as will be highlighted below. Hugo Slim’s (2015) recent work on 
the ethics of humanitarian organisations similarly tackles the concept of dilemmas from the 
perspective of moral philosophy. 
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Complicity Dilemmas 
In complicity dilemmas, the actions required to achieve a desired effect lead 
the agent to become entangled in the wrongdoing of others. To avoid 
complicity entirely, the agent would have to sacrifice the positive effect of her 
intended actions; but due to the normative context created by others’ 
wrongdoing, achieving this positive effect would advance the undesired, 
negative effects of their actions.  
In our use of the term, stating that the agent faces a dilemma of complicity in 
the wrongdoing implies two things. First, that she does not share the 
wrongdoer’s objectives (otherwise, this is not a dilemma). In this, we part 
ways with theorists who view shared intentions with the principal wrongdoer 
as constitutive of the concept of complicity.28 Second, that her acts do not, in 
themselves, constitute part of the wrongdoing – they are only indirectly 
linked to it. Crucially, the actions advancing the positive effect would not be 
connected to the negative effects were it not for the principal wrongdoer’s 
actions. 
Not all instances of complicity are political in the sense we discuss here. A 
famous example of moral complicity is provided in Book I of Plato’s Republic. 
Cephalus, Socrates’ interlocutor, suggests that justice entails speaking the 
truth and paying one’s debts. Socrates immediately points out that in some 
instances, given another agent’s wrongdoing, repaying one’s debts will 
generate a negative effect. If a friend is not of a right mind, and is inclined to 
harm himself or others (therefore becoming a wrongdoer), returning a 
borrowed knife to him would be a bad idea. Socrates argues that “repaying 
                                                        
28 See for example Kutz 2007; Rubenstein 2015, 97–9. 
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one’s debts” cannot be the right definition of justice; alternatively, we can 
suggest that an agent in this predicament faces a moral dilemma of 
complicity: they can only repay their debt by being complicit with harm, or 
avoid complicity by not repaying their debt. 
Political complicity is more complicated, as the relationship between the 
actions of the principal wrongdoer and the complicit agent is mediated 
through institutions. For the sake of simplicity, and without committing our 
account to Lepora and Goodin’s influential map of complicity and its 
“conceptual cousins”, it suffices to say that the agent can become complicit 
with the wrongdoing in at least one of two ways.29 First, the agent can become 
complicit by causally contributing to the wrongdoing. Secondly, the agent can 
become complicit by condoning or legitimising the wrongdoing, even when she 
is not directly causally contributing to the wrong act itself. Thus, for example, 
Iris Marion Young argues that western consumers are complicit in the harms 
of sweatshop labour in the developing world – even though their individual 
purchase cannot be seen a causing this harm – because their continued 
consumption legitimises the practices of the apparel industry.30 
Beyond these two paths, there are more complicated (and more controversial) 
cases of complicity that can generate the dilemma. These include cases in 
which the agent becomes complicit in the wrongdoing of others by benefitting 
from it, which we may interpret as a way of legitimising the wrongdoing. 
                                                        
29 Lepora and Goodin 2013, 31–53. They differentiate between cases of causal contribution 
(complicity, simpliciter and collaboration) and cases in which there is usually no causal 
contribution (connivance, condoning, consorting and contiguity). While they argue that 
complicity necessarily involves causal contribution, they concede that the latter group may 
sometime be classified as complicity. Our position here is therefore broader. 
30 Young 2006. 
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There are also cases in which the agent is just one part of a collective that is 
committing the wrongdoing, and therefore it is more difficult to say that she 
has made a direct causal contribution to the wrongdoing.31 As these are not 
relevant to the case of the donor’s dilemma – in which donors do not typically 
benefit from rights’ violations, and are not part of a collective agent – we 
disregard these possibilities in what follows. It is important, however, to note 
that their general structure is similar: the agent facing the dilemma is not the 
principal wrongdoer, and the dilemma arises from the link between her 
actions (towards the positive effect) and the actions of the principal 
wrongdoer (towards the negative effect).  
 
Double Effect Dilemmas 
In moral philosophy, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) could be 
summarised as maintaining that “…sometimes it is permissible to cause a 
harm as a side effect of bringing about a good result even though it would not 
be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same 
good end”.32 A classic example in moral philosophy involves what is known 
as “Trolley Problems”, in which the lives of five people could be saved by 
sacrificing the life of one other person. Moral intuitions differ between 
impermissible cases in which the death of the one person is a means for 
saving the five, and permissible cases in which this killing is an unintended 
                                                        
31 On these further complications, See, respectively, Goodin and Barry 2014; Kutz 2007. It 
should be noted that Kutz’s account of complicity is different to ours, since he emphasises 
participatory intentions of complicit agents. 
32 McIntyre 2014. 
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side effect.33 The conditions for permissible double-effects are restrictive. They 
may require, for example, that the action itself must be morally good or at 
least indifferent; that the positive effect must be produced directly by the 
action, not by the negative effect; that the positive effect must be proportional 
to the negative effect; and, perhaps most importantly, that the agent does not 
will the negative effect. 
From the perspective of political theory, however, this account is problematic. 
First, focusing on a particular agent’s intention is not obviously relevant for 
the assessment of actions and effects. 34 Yet simply dropping the condition of 
intentionality would not do, since the evaluation of the act would then turn 
on the comparison of the positive and negative effects, collapsing into a 
consequentialist position, which merely dissolves the dilemma.  
A further complication arises from the observation that political action in 
complex societies is very different from the actions described in traditional 
examples of double effect. In these examples, the direct action of the agent is 
the source of both the positive and negative effects – such as, in Philippa 
Foot’s example, a doctor saving the life of a pregnant woman while killing her 
foetus. Political action, however, rarely has this direct relation to effects, as it 
is often mediated by other agents. Even the direct orders of a political leader 
are carried out by other people. Strictly speaking, the free reactions of an 
agent to another agent’s actions cannot count as effect; they are seen as a new 
action that breaks the chain of causation.  
                                                        
33 Foot 1967. 
34 Rubenstein 2015, 99–100 rejects Double Effect as a useful model for the cases she discusses 
because INGOs usually operate with good intentions. Our reasoning here is different.  
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The general structure of double effect, however, can still be useful for political 
analysis if properly reconstructed. We argue that a political reading of double 
effect dilemmas would interpret them as cases in which the structural 
constraints imposed on the political agent produce a situation in which 
actions towards desired effects generate negative side effects. These structural 
constraints may be caused by the agent’s own previous failure, by the failure 
or wrong actions of other agents, or, more controversially, by conditions that 
are not the fault of any agent in particular. In other words, whether the trolley 
problem is a moral or political dilemma will depend on how the people tied 
to the tracks wound up there. 
Unlike complicity dilemmas, the negative side effect is not generated by the 
actions of an independent agent, with which the primary agent is complicit. 
The negative side effect is generated by the actions of the agent facing the 
dilemma. Even when the dilemma is forced on the agent by the structure of 
constraints, it is still her actions that generate the wrong.  
This institutional interpretation allows us to answer the problem of socially 
mediated action. Effects are distinguished from free reactions not simply by 
being what follows naturally from action, but also by being what follows 
from the ordinary operation of social institutions. For example, when we mail 
a letter, it could be said that the letter’s arrival at its destination is the effect of 
our action even though it is the postman that does the actual delivery.35 This 
final point is crucial for distinguishing cases of complicity from cases of 
double effect since, as stated above, in double effect dilemmas the negative 
effects follow from the actions of the primary agent. Understood structurally, 
                                                        
35 Cf. Donagan 1991. 
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we posit that double effect dilemmas arise not only in cases in which the 
direct action of the agent causes the negative effect, but also in cases in which 
the foreseeable actions of other agents, given certain institutional and 
structural failings, generate the negative effect. Secondary agents, in cases of 
double effect, are viewed as part of the structure in which the action of the 
principal agent is performed. 
 
Dirty Hands Dilemmas 
In dirty hands dilemmas, the agent acts in a way that would generate a 
negative effect as a means for achieving the positive effect. Unlike cases of 
complicity, the negative effects are the result of the agent’s own actions, and 
not an independent wrongdoer’s. Unlike double effect, the negative effect is 
not merely foreseeable. Rather, it is seen as a means – perhaps the only means 
– to achieve the desired positive effect. One thing may cause another thing 
without being a means to an end, and this distinction need not rely on the 
controversial distinction between intending an effect and merely foreseeing 
it.36 
Unlike Complicity and Double Effect, the problem of dirty hands is usually 
discussed in a political context. One may ask, therefore, what makes the 
political interpretation we offer here distinctive?37 We argue that even within 
the context of political action, the problem of dirty hands is often interpreted 
as a moral dilemma; a clash between the politician’s personal ethical 
                                                        
36 See Cavanaugh 2006. 
37 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this challenge. 
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commitments and the requirements of political power. 38  A classic and 
notorious example of this moral dilemma is the “Ticking Bomb” case: a 
person with the knowledge of an imminent terrorist attack is held by the 
authorities, and will only share this information if he is tortured. A 
responsible political leader may have to authorise such measures, but given 
that torture is morally wrong she should still feel guilty about it. 
From the point of view of political theory, however, this reading of the dirty 
hands problem is misleading. Viewing the dilemma as a clash between 
personal morality and the obligations of a politician’s role unduly focuses on 
the individual agent, rather than on the structure of competing political 
objectives. Understood politically, dirty hands dilemmas arise where different 
political goals – e.g. stability, security, fairness, justice – are in tension with 
each other, and some goals must be sacrificed or compromised to maintain 
others.39 We do not deny that the clash between politicians’ role obligations 
and their own moral commitments may have an effect on political 
institutions.40 Importantly, however, the political reading of the dirty hands 
dilemma is primarily not about the tension between personal morality and 
political necessity.  
In line with the general rejection of dilemmas, some ethicists reject the 
conceptual possibility of dirty hands as “doing wrong in order to do right” 
and argue that there is no special problem of dirty hands.41 However, as with 
                                                        
38 Walzer 1973. 
39 This does not, necessarily, mean the use of violence, as is implied by Rubenstein 2015, 102. 
The interpretation of the Dirty Hands dilemma provided here is structural, not substantive.  
40 Archard 2013; see Bellamy 2010. 
41 E.g. Nielsen 2007. 
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other political dilemmas, dirty hands cases may arise from previous 
wrongdoings of the agent or from the wrongdoings of others, and as such are 
not conceptually confused. Nevertheless, dirty hands are unique, since they 
represent an exceptionally difficult case: one in which the agent herself has to 
do wrong and not just contribute to it in an indirect way or as a side effect. 
This distinguishes the political understanding of dirty hands from the moral 
one, as it identifies these dilemmas as rare exceptions, or limiting cases for the 
normative framework – unlike the more common cases of clashes between the 
politician’s personal morality and the responsibilities of political office. 
A political reading of the dirty hands dilemma, therefore, must be able to 
identify the exceptional circumstances in which such radical action may be 
unavoidable. One possible route is to consider cases in which certain 
normative commitments are suspended to secure the conditions that enable 
them in the first place. Several theorists, for example, have argued that the 
“first political question”, i.e. securing and maintaining peace, order and 
stability, is both prior to, and a necessary condition for the fulfilment of 
further political ideals such as socioeconomic justice, political representation 
and government transparency. This position sees the legitimacy of any 
government as hinging on its ability to address the first political question, 
especially in cases of catastrophe or emergency.42  
Complicity, double effect, and dirty hands – understood as models of political 
dilemmas – arise in different contexts and create distinct normative problems 
for the political agent. It is important for the agent, therefore, not only to 
recognise that she is facing a dilemma, but also which dilemma she faces. Real 
                                                        
42 Williams 2007. For a defence, see Hall 2015. 
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politics is, of course, a messy business. We do not wish to suggest that every 
context will perfectly fit the mould of one of our proposed models. For 
instance, there may be more complex cases of different dilemmas arising 
simultaneously. For the moment, we propose this framework as a conceptual 
distinction between different ideal-types of political dilemmas. With the 
general framework in place, we can turn to the context of aid to regimes that 
are implicated in rights violations. This will serve to highlight the 
complexities of the normative framework, as well as inform the justified 
responses to each specific dilemma.   
 
NAVIGATING THE DONOR’S DILEMMA 
In this section, we consider our general framework of political dilemmas in 
the specific context of donor aid provisions to states that violate rights. In 
doing so, we provide examples of each type of dilemma in the development 
context. We also discuss how donors can recognise the type of dilemma they 
face, and the potential short-term and long-term responses of donors to 
navigate the specific dilemma.  
In brief, we argue that the three dilemmas differ according to the relationship 
between the actions of political actors situated in specific social structures, 
and the effects of these actions. To distinguish between the dilemmas that 
donors face, we first need to establish whether the rights violation is 
connected to positive development outcomes. If the wrongdoing is 
considered necessary for the government to bring about the stability and 
order needed to achieve positive development outcomes, the donor is faced 
with a dirty hands dilemma. If the wrongdoing is unrelated to the positive 
outcome, then the donor faces either a complicity or double effect dilemma. 
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To distinguish between these latter two dilemmas, we need to consider 
whether the aid the donor provides has a direct causal role in the rights 
violation unmediated by an independent wrongdoer. If the provision of aid 
gives rise to the wrongdoing, then the donor faces a double effect dilemma. If, 
however, it is likely the rights violation would have occurred regardless of the 
aid, we argue the donor is faced with a complicity dilemma.   
It is important to clarify that what follows is not intended to be an algorithm 
for resolving political dilemmas; nor do we provide practitioners with an 
answer to the perennial question of “what to do on Monday morning”.43 
Nevertheless, we argue that this framework can help highlight the relevant 
normative and political considerations in each context.  
 
Aid and Complicity  
Complicity dilemmas are cases in which, given the wrongdoings of the 
recipient government; the donor government action towards development 
goals either directly contributes causally to rights violations, or provides 
implicit legitimation for them. The principal wrongdoer is the recipient 
government, whose violation of rights generates the dilemma. This violation 
of rights is not generated or constituted by the aid and is not a means to 
achieving positive development outcomes. Therefore, the problem donors 
face is that the funding they provide solidifies the power of the recipient 
government and provides it with legitimacy.  
Complicity is the most widely discussed normative context in the literature 
on the ethics of aid. A paradigmatic case is the abuse of international aid 
                                                        
43 Hudson and Leftwich 2014. 
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resources (provided by INGOs) in refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and 
Tanzania during and immediately following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.44 
Members of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF), who sought 
to re-establish their military force, abused humanitarian aid and used 
civilians in the camps as human shields. As Rubenstein describes, “[S]hould 
humanitarian INGOs that are committed to acting consistently with 
democratic and egalitarian norms accept contributing knowingly but 
unintentionally to injustices committed primarily by other actors?”45  
These cases are structurally similar to complicity dilemmas of state donors, 
although arguably, unlike INGOs that only serve quasi-governmental 
functions, state donors have more direct responsibility for the political effects 
of their actions. This is because they are both able to exert more influence on 
recipient governments, and are accountable to their public. Therefore, the 
threshold for being complicit is lower. One possible way of identifying 
complicity is to track the causal contribution to the wrong committed by 
recipient governments. For example, as Peter Uvin demonstrates in Aiding 
Violence, French development aid in Rwanda was used to acquire weapons 
later used in the Tutsi genocide.46 There is no question here that the principal 
wrongdoer is the Hutu government, of course, but as Uvin’s narrative 
demonstrates, France and other Western states can be seen as complicit in this 
                                                        
44 Lepora and Goodin 2013; Rubenstein 2015. 
45  Rubenstein 2015, 91–2. Note that Rubenstein explicitly rejects the complicity label for her 
“spattered hands” account, as she assumes complicity requires sharing intentions with the 
principal wrongdoer (see Rubenstein 2015, 97–9). Nili’s discussion of “foreign entanglement” 
addresses a similar argument in the context of international trade and the resource curse (Nili 
2016.) 
46 Uvin 1998. 
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wrong since aid money was flowing in even when signs, such as the 
escalation of racialised propaganda, indicated the real possibility of mass 
violence. 
While providing external legitimacy to regimes that violate rights may not 
causally contribute to the rights violation directly, it can be considered a case 
of complicity. The most egregious recent examples were common during the 
Cold War, where Western aid – albeit with the ulterior intention of 
preventing the spread of communism – legitimised leaders who were on the 
‘right’ side of the Iron Curtain, while at the same time strengthening their 
position vis-à-vis internal opposition. The dictatorships of Mobutu Sese Seko 
in the DRC and the Duvalliers in Haiti are glaring examples of Western 
failure to recognise this tension. For our purposes, the fact that the primary 
goal of aid during the Cold War was one of political influence rather than 
development is not significant; the structure of the dilemma remains the 
same. 
As is evident from the example of French aid to Rwanda, ignorance of causal 
mechanisms is not an excuse, given the responsibility of donor states for the 
effects of their actions. To avoid blind complicity, donors need to invest 
resources in working with local stakeholders that may provide valuable 
contextual knowledge, identify reasons for concern, and make it possible to 
monitor the situation on the ground to avoid culpable ignorance.  
If and when complicity in rights violations is recognised, in most cases – at 
least in the short term – it is likely that the best course of action for donors is 
to detach; in other words, to withdraw aid and sever the causal or 
legitimising contribution to the wrongdoing. This is clearly the case when the 
relative weight of the negative effect is considerably higher than any benefit 
generated by aid. Even in more nuanced cases, complicity in wrongdoing can 
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undermine the positive effects of aid.47 Nevertheless, the conceptualisation of 
the problem as a dilemma highlights the fact that withdrawing aid generates 
“moral remainders”, as the positive effect of development is now withdrawn. 
How to address these remainders is dependent on context – for example, 
whether aid was in place but then withdrawn, creating dependency. It would 
also not be enough simply to keep hands clean, especially in cases in which 
there was previous involvement; in these cases, there is a need to publicly 
denounce the recipient government’s wrongdoing, in addition to detaching. 
We further consider donors’ short-term responses to complicity dilemmas by 
briefly discussing two recent examples. The first is the withdrawal of DFID’s 
and other development donors’ budget support to Malawi in 2011, which we 
argue is a positive example of how donors could respond to complicity 
dilemmas in the short term. The decision to stop providing aid directly to the 
Malawian government came because of concerns over economic 
mismanagement and governance in the country. 48  DFID issued a clear 
statement that explained the suspension of budget support was in large part 
due to deteriorating governance in the country, including the suppression of 
demonstrations, the intimidation of civil society organisations, and the 
introduction of legislation that would make it easier for the Malawian 
government to place restrictions on opponents without legal challenge. 
Andrew Mitchell, the Secretary of State for International Development at the 
time, added: 
The UK provides development assistance in order to help communities 
lift themselves out of grinding poverty… But poor people in Malawi and 
                                                        
47 Easterly 2007, 117–23. 
48 Tran 2011. 
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British taxpayers alike have been let down. In those circumstances I 
cannot justify the provision of general budget support for Malawi… In 
the meantime we will use other means to ensure that programmes to 
protect poor Malawians… are able to continue.49 
The decision to suspend budget support had a significant negative impact on 
the Malawian economy and on living standards in the country – 
demonstrating the dilemma the UK government faced. 50  However, as the 
statement makes clear, DFID and other donors continued to support 
initiatives for improving basic needs such as health, education, and water and 
sanitation through project aid.51 In other words, while DFID’s decision had a 
negative effect, efforts were made to address the moral remainders created by 
DFID’s withdrawal of budget support. It is also worth noting that DFID 
explicitly linked the reestablishment of budget support to addressing issues of 
economic mismanagement and governance. Given the Malawian 
government’s dependence on UK aid, the withdrawal of aid appears to have 
led to efforts to improve governance, which DFID has monitored and publicly 
encouraged. 52  DFID’s short-term response to the deterioration of political 
rights in Malawi, we argue, provides a good example of how donors might 
address complicity dilemmas. 
In contrast, DFID’s response to accusations of complicity in rights violations 
committed by the Ethiopian government demonstrates the problems with 
more typical donor responses. In late 2014, DFID suspended its project to 
                                                        
49 Mitchell and Department of International Development 2011. 
50 Anon 2011b; Dionne and Dulani 2012. 
51 Tenthani 2014. 
52 Kainja 2014; Tran 2012. 
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support the Ethiopian police force at the same time Amnesty International 
produced a report documenting how Ethiopian security forces had tortured, 
mutilated, raped, and murdered Ethiopians to suppress political opposition. 
Yet, despite an internal assessment of the police support project that 
suggested it posed a high risk of being complicit in human rights violations, 
DFID denied the cancellation of the project was related to concerns about 
human rights. The internal assessment document was also removed from 
DFID’s website.53 
There may be cases in which the benefits of aid, or the foreseeable negative 
effects of withdrawing aid, outweigh the negative effects of complicity.54 In 
such cases, the short-term response to the dilemma would not necessarily be 
detachment. However, it is important to note that this is merely the short 
term, local response. A context in which complicity with rights violations of a 
wrongdoer is the lesser evil is one that needs to be transformed, if and when 
such transformation is feasible. Donors may accept a level of complicity as a 
necessary evil but, given the dilemmatic structure of this case, they need to 
ensure they do not lose sight of their responsibilities for the harmed parties, 
as well as to the imperative of reform. 
 
Aid and Double Effect 
Unlike complicity dilemmas, the negative effect of rights violations in double 
effect cases is seen as a consequence of the actions donors take towards 
                                                        
53 Holehouse 2014. 
54 For example, if the withdrawal of aid would leave the recipient state open to the influence 
of a “morally worse actor” (see Wisor 2014). 
  
29 
 
positive development goals, rather than as actions of independent 
wrongdoers. As we have pointed out, this need not mean that this is the 
direct effect of the donors’ actions, but it is a foreseeable side effect that is 
affected by structural and institutional constraints. It may be that the actions 
of the donor are mediated through the actions of participants in social 
institutions; however, the key point is that it is the donors’ actions that 
ultimately brought about the negative side effect.  
Some examples of double effect dilemmas of aid are not directly related to 
rights abuses. For example, malaria prevention is clearly a beneficial effect of 
aid, and the free distribution of mosquito nets is considered a cost-effective 
and targeted measure towards this goal. However, recent research in Zambia 
shows that the introduction of light, strong and free nets has led to the 
unintended consequence of local communities using the nets for fishing 
rather than their intended purpose. This has adverse effects not only on the 
wildlife of the Lake Tanganyika, but also the health of local communities 
whose fish and drinking water are now contaminated by insecticide.55  
An example in the context of aid and rights is the case of the DFID-supported 
Local Government and Community Development Programme (LGCDP) in 
Nepal. The programme aimed to strengthen local governance by establishing 
local representative bodies that can influence government spending decisions. 
However, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) found that the 
project “increased the opportunities for corruption in society”.56 Citizens had 
to pay bribes to government officials and forge documents to receive funding 
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for projects supported by LGCDP. Subsequently, the programme was 
criticised by the ICAI for pushing the poor towards corrupt practices, and 
increasing “the perception among the poor that corruption is a necessary and 
legitimate way of acting.” 57 Furthermore, the funds provided by DFID and 
other donors were captured by political elites, who directed the funds 
towards their preferred projects. In fact, the Economist’s investigation into the 
programme found that struggles among political elites to capture these funds 
led to violence in some districts. More broadly, the programme is seen as 
having led to a situation at the local government level where “politicians 
enjoy freedom to plunder with impunity”. 58 
This case illustrates how double effect dilemmas differ from complicity 
dilemmas. This is particularly relevant when mediating agents cannot be seen 
as autonomous but instead are part of the foreseeable political and 
institutional context. In states with weak institutions, donors’ actions can 
introduce new incentives that may have perverse effects on the stability and 
accountability of the local government. 59  If the negative effect of rights 
violations can be traced back to the donor’s actions (and not, as in complicity 
cases, where donors only facilitate or legitimate the actions of the recipient 
government), then the normative context is one of double effect. The LGCDP 
case is an example of the double effect dilemma because donors’ aid 
provisions in Nepal’s weak institutional context created a situation in which 
politicians in local government could plunder from the local population. 
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58 Anon 2011a. 
59 Jones 2014. 
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Furthermore, according to the ICAI (2014), this effect of the aid was 
foreseeable given the political context.60   
It is important to emphasise that the difference between double effect and 
complicity is not one of moral responsibility. The fact that corruption was a 
foreseeable side effect given structural constraints does not relieve the corrupt 
officials in the recipient state of blame. However, unlike cases of complicity, 
since the negative side effect could be predicted on the basis of structural 
constraints rather than the agency of a particular leader or government, the 
political responsibility of donor states is of a different kind. In other words, the 
relevant distinction is not of moral responsibility (who is culpable), but of 
recognising the link between actions and effects and best resolving the 
dilemma.61  
To recognise a double effect dilemma, it is therefore necessary to have both 
contextual knowledge and an understanding of political and social 
mechanisms. Donors need to ask whether the negative effects of aid would 
have occurred if a different local actor were in place. This would enable 
donors to understand whether the cause of the wrongdoing is structural or 
agential. In thinking about this, we need not say whether this other local actor 
actually exists at the present time, but whether the actor could feasibly exist 
given the history and institutional structures of a given context.  
                                                        
60 This is a key difference between this case and the Malawi example discussed above. In the 
Malawi case, UK aid did not cause the rights violations, nor was there reason for DFID to 
believe that providing aid would lead to rights violations, given previous involvement. 
Hence, it is a complicity dilemma. The Nepal case is one of double effect because the aid 
programme generated the rights abuses, and furthermore; based on the ICAI review, DFID 
should have seen this possibility, given the structural context in Nepal.  
61 On this important distinction, see Thompson 1980. 
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As the negative side effects arise from the donor’s own actions, the focus of 
short-term responses to double effect dilemmas needs to be on the 
proportionality of the positive effects of development outcomes and the 
negative side effects. Since the negative effects are side effects and not a 
means to an end, the aim would be to minimise them as much as possible and 
to engage with and compensate affected parties. Furthermore, as the 
relationship between actions and effects is structural and not agential, the 
short-term aim will be to strengthen institutions rather than address the 
wrongdoings of specific actors.  
The types of measures to put in place when faced with double effect 
dilemmas include greater emphasis on monitoring the impact of development 
programmes and more frequent and direct interactions between donors and 
the stakeholders. Indeed, both recommendations were made by the ICAI for 
the DFID-funded LGCDP programme in Nepal. 62  Additional measures 
include ensuring that accountability mechanisms are built into programme 
design. For example, the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Mekong Business 
Initiative project includes providing a forum “where people adversely 
affected by ADB-assisted projects can voice and seek solutions to their 
problems” and register complaints. 63  In addition, donors may need to 
compensate those adversely affected by their programmes.  
In the long term, however, proportionality is not enough. The institutional 
and structural failures that generate the dilemma in the first place need to be 
addressed and ameliorated in order to escape the dilemmatic context. The 
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focus of long-term response, therefore, will be on reforming the institutional 
structures that generate the negative side effect, as well as restoring agency to 
recipient governments. The latter type of response, of course, needs to take 
complicity concerns into account. 
 
Aid and Dirty Hands 
In dirty hands dilemmas, the violation or limitation of civic rights is seen as 
necessary for sustaining the basic order and stability of the state when these 
are threatened. Without these, the possibility of achieving socioeconomic 
development and the protection of political and civil liberties in the long term 
is undermined. This means that in the dirty hands scenario the negative 
outcome (rights violations) is seen as a means to achieving the positive 
outcome. In other words, the negative effect is not a side effect or unrelated to 
the positive effect as in the previous dilemmas; it is a necessary route towards 
the positive outcome. The recipient government is faced with a dirty hands 
dilemma of the first order; the donors face a dirty hands dilemma of the 
second order, by providing aid to the recipient government. 
There is evidence from the history of development to support the theory that 
democracy and rights protection requires a minimum level of economic 
development, and that autocratic developmental regimes may be best placed 
to achieve this minimum level. An important example is South Korea’s 
development process. The country’s transformation from one of the poorest 
nations in the world in 1960 to one of the wealthiest by the early 2000s is 
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widely viewed as “one of the great development success stories, of the 
contemporary, or any other, era”.64  
The emergence of the developmental state in South Korea followed a military 
coup in 1961, which brought General Park Chung-Hee to power. The Korean 
developmental state experimented with different policies to promote 
industrialisation and high rates of economic growth.65 The government was 
able to implement its industrialisation strategy because of “extensive access to 
American and international aid funds”.66 Subsequently, South Korea is held 
up as a clear example how “foreign assistance combined with sound 
institutions and policies… produce good results”.67 
Importantly, the development success that South Korea achieved occurred 
under an autocratic regime. Indeed, the country is used as an example of how 
autocratic regimes may be better placed to implement long-term measures to 
bring about economic transformation.68 This is despite the substantial human 
rights abuses that took place under South Korea’s autocratic regime.69 It was 
only in the late 1980s, following mass pro-democracy protests, that Korea 
adopted a democratic system, which led to the protection of civil and political 
rights. However, this came about once a minimum threshold of development 
was achieved. Hence, for many the Korean example demonstrates how the 
                                                        
64 Levy 2014, 55. 
65 Amsden 1989; Chang and Evans 2005. 
66 Mardon 1990, 114. 
67 Dollar and Levin 2006, 2034. 
68 Levy 2014, 55–8. 
69 In 2012, while running for office, President Park Geun-Hye issued an apology for the 
human rights abuses that occurred under the rule of her father, General Park Chung-Hee. See 
BBC News (2015). 
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process of economic development can lead to democratic governance and the 
protection of civil and political rights. The short-term response from donors to 
a dirty hands dilemma, therefore, needs to focus on questions of political 
legitimacy, and for this task, donors will need evidence that the rights 
violations are being used as a means to a justifiable end. This evidence cannot 
merely rely on the claims of the recipient state but, as in the case of 
complicity, would need to build on the local knowledge of stakeholders. This 
is further complicated by the fact that even when some government policies 
might be legitimate, others are not, and donors should be sensitive to this fact. 
As the wrong committed is serious, the threshold for accepting this evidence 
must be high. 
Legitimacy is a key factor in dirty hands dilemmas. As noted previously, 
developmental regimes gained legitimacy through their ability to deliver on 
positive outcomes in the short term. It is crucial to acknowledge that – unlike 
in cases of complicity – the recipient government may need to be legitimised, 
domestically and internationally, in order to successfully maintain the level of 
stability required for development. Donors’ endorsement of the recipient 
government will be conditional, and both the donor and the recipient 
government will still need to acknowledge that a wrong is being committed 
while maintaining that this is necessary given the circumstances.  
In the longer term, the donor needs to ensure the recipient government 
retains its legitimacy through setting clear timeframes and identifiable goals. 
These goals underlie the transitional nature of the dirty hands dilemma. 
Unlike traditional political conditionalities, these would have to be more 
flexible and context-specific: they will differ from case to case according to the 
particular history, political constraints and feasibility of reform in each state. 
In the rationale of dirty hands situations, the rights violations taking place in 
  
36 
 
the present are transitional in that they are helping to pave the way towards a 
time when such rights violations do not take place and politics is 
“normalised”.  
Donors would also need to ensure that they are not promoting a particular 
leader or political party, but are focusing on the function of governments in 
maintaining conditions of stability and order. This is something that donors 
have frequently failed to do.70 Yet this failure restricts the move to politics as 
normal and prevents donors from being flexible and being able to adapt to 
changing circumstances. This is especially crucial when the normative context 
has moved from dirty hands to one of complicity, requiring a different kind of 
response.  
 
Recognition and Response 
Having discussed each of the dilemmas that can arise from providing aid to 
states that violate rights, we consider the three dilemmas together. We outline 
the main differences between the dilemmas, further demonstrating how each 
dilemma can be recognised. This also provides further justification for the 
response to each of the dilemmas dilemma that we have identified.  
As we have explained, the three dilemmas differ according to the relationship 
between the actions of political actors situated in specific social structures, 
and the effects of these actions. This leads to two considerations for 
recognising which of the three dilemmas an aid donor faces. The first is 
                                                        
70 Easterly 2014 discusses how donors frequently focus on promoting individual leaders. The 
problem with this approach has been discussed in detail in the case of Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame (see Smith 2012). 
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whether the rights violation is connected to positive development outcomes. 
If the wrongdoing is deemed necessary for the government to bring about the 
stability and order required to achieve positive development outcomes, then 
this would imply the donor is faced with a dirty hands dilemma. If the 
wrongdoing is unrelated to positive outcome, then the donor is faced with 
either a complicity dilemma or a double effect dilemma. The second 
consideration, which enables us to distinguish between the latter two 
dilemmas, is whether aid provided by the donor has a direct causal role in the 
wrongdoing unmediated by an independent wrongdoer. If aid provisions 
give rise to the wrongdoing, then the donor faces a double effect dilemma. If, 
however, it would be reasonable to believe that the wrongdoing would have 
occurred regardless of the aid provision, then the donor is faced with a 
complicity dilemma.   
The differences between the three dilemmas are related to the issues of 
agency and legitimacy. In both complicity and dirty hands dilemmas, the 
recipient government is seen as exercising its agency in committing the rights 
violations and the distinguishing factors is the background context. The 
required response to each of these dilemmas is very different, as a “false 
positive” (wrongly identifying cases of dirty hands as complicity) risks 
undermining the conditions needed for rights to be secured, while a “false 
negative” (wrongly identifying cases of complicity as dirty hands) risks the 
donors becoming complicit in the rights violations of the recipient 
government. In contrast, double effects dilemmas are those in which rights 
violations are seen as being generated by structural factors. Therefore, 
distinguishing between double effect and complicity dilemmas requires 
donors to assess whether agents or structures generate the negative effects.  
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The issue of legitimacy is also important in considering the differences 
between the three dilemmas. In the complicity and dirty hands dilemmas, aid 
provides the recipient government with de facto legitimacy. In the former, 
this is seen as unjustified and undermining the donor’s objectives. This is why 
the short-term response may be detachment. In the case of dirty hands 
dilemmas, this de facto legitimacy is seen in a more positive light, as it helps 
the recipient government address the first political question of providing 
stability, thereby contributing to achieving the donor’s goals. Hence, the 
response to dirty hands dilemmas is to ensure that there is reason to believe 
that the actions of the recipient government are providing political stability. 
In contrast, aid does not have a legitimising effect in the case of double effect 
dilemmas, as the recipient government is not seen as an independent agent. 
Hence, the response to double effect dilemmas is to minimise the negative 
effects of aid, and ensure there is some proportionality between the positive 
and negative effects of aid.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have considered the dilemma donors face in providing aid 
to states that violate rights. By developing a distinctively political framework 
for analysing dilemmas, we have shown that the donor’s dilemma is, in fact, 
three different dilemmas. Complicity, double effect and dirty hands dilemmas 
in development aid arise in different contexts and require different responses. 
Using the context of development aid has also enabled us to highlight the 
differences between the models of dilemmas we have identified in our 
conceptual framework. It shows that the role our conceptual framework plays 
will depend on how the political agent perceives its goals, and the particular 
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circumstances in which its actions give rise to both positive and negative 
effects.  
Contrary to dominant approaches in development theory and practice, our 
argument demonstrates that a politically realistic approach to the donor’s 
dilemma, which is sensitive to context and political complexity, need not be 
normatively silent. Rather, it is important for donors to acknowledge that 
they face a dilemma, to recognise what kind of dilemma they face, and to 
respond accordingly. Acknowledging the dilemma is important because both 
recognising the dilemma and deciding on the appropriate response require 
engagement with relevant actors and stakeholders. 
A second insight of our research is that focusing on actions and effects would 
help donors address these dilemmas in a structural, rather than personal 
manner. Acknowledging such dilemmas has frequently been hindered by 
donors’ tendency to conflate the choice between the two horns of the dilemma 
with the choice of whether to support or oppose the contingent leadership of 
the recipient state. As we have discussed, even when legitimising the actions 
of the government may be important, an overemphasis on a particular leader 
or party is more likely to constrain the transition away from the context of the 
dilemma rather than facilitate it.  
The third insight is that it is necessary to go beyond the dichotomies of aid 
provision, which tend to emphasise only two choices; fully endorsing 
financial support to developmental regimes, or withdrawing aid to preserve 
the moral integrity of the donors. The lack of attention to contextual 
constraints and to the dilemmatic nature of this problem leads to both of these 
well-intentioned approaches having perverse outcomes – for example, 
mistaking complicity dilemmas for dirty hands dilemmas. The framework we 
have proposed demonstrates the nuanced nature of these situations, and the 
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different responses and measures available to donors based on better 
understanding the situation that they face.   
Finally, normative considerations aside, there are likely to be sound 
instrumental benefits to the framework developed in this paper. The long-
term success of development aid depends on consistent public support.71 
Some may see this explicit acknowledgement of the dilemmas donors face as 
risking support for development aid more broadly; we argue the opposite. As 
the media discussion around cases like that of Mr O and DFID’s support for 
the Ethiopian government demonstrate, there is a real danger of a backlash 
against international aid where rights are seen to be violated. By explicitly 
acknowledging and addressing these dilemmas, donors would be able to 
make the case for responding differently to normatively distinct situations, 
thus strengthening the public legitimacy of development aid. 
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